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Abstract
Why do some terrorist organizations, but not others, adopt suicide bombing as a
tactic? Dominant accounts focusing on organizational capacity, ideology, and efficacy
leave certain elements of the phenomenon unexplained. The authors argue that a
key factor that influences whether a terrorist organization does or does not adopt
suicide terrorism is cultural resonance. This is the idea that deep and specific cultural
logics, which transcend religion and nationalism, enable and constrain the sorts of
instrumental behaviors that can be utilized in the pursuit of group goals. The article
investigates the role of a well-established cultural orientation of collectivism, which
enables the authors to measure culture systematically. Case studies, survey data, and
experimental research are used to illustrate that collectivism lowers the cost of
adoption by facilitating the recruitment of attackers and reducing societal backlash
against self-sacrifice. The authors then test for the relationship between collectivism
and suicide-bombing adoption using an event history analysis framework, finding
a strong correlation.
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Over the last couple of decades, suicide terrorism has spread over the globe like
a wildfire, increasing in scope, frequency, and intensity (Moghadam 2008). An
increasing portion of terrorist organizations has been adding the tactic to their
arsenal as shown in Figure 1. What explains this lethal tactic’s spread and why do
some terrorist organizations adopt it while others refrain from doing so?
Attempts to answer these questions have produced a voluminous literature. While
there is a plethora of particular accounts, the dominant explanations come in three
flavors, each focusing on a particular explanatory force: organizational capacity,
efficacy, and ideology. Although these perspectives are useful in explaining some
aspects of suicide-bombing diffusion, they leave others unexplained. This is because
they have problems conceptualizing costs and actors involved in the tactic’s adop-
tion processes. Standing on the shoulders of a long-standing tradition in sociology
(Tarde [1903] 1962), we try to shed new light on adoption processes by considering
the role of deeper underlying cultural dimensions of adopters. These cultural dimen-
sions transcend religion or nation and enable the sorts of instrumental behaviors that
can be adopted in the pursuit of group goals. In order to understand the relationship
between culture and diffusion, we introduce the concept of ‘‘cultural resonance’’: the
idea that actors are more likely to adopt innovations when the innovations connect to
their cultural orientations.
Although culture has long been considered central to international relations
theory and the study of transnational diffusion, cultural resonance has not been often
studied in a rigorous way due to measurement problems. To assess the utility of the
role of cultural resonance, we therefore make use of insights from cultural sociology
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Figure 1. Percentage of terrorist organizations active in a given year that adopted suicide
bombings, 1981–2006.
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(Hofstede 2001), an area in which quantifying culture is more common. This enables
us to assess the role of cultural resonance in a quantitative framework using fine-
grained survey instruments that measure culture. We focus on the adoption of sui-
cide terrorism and a particular cultural dimension: collectivism–individualism.
Persons in collectivist cultures tend to be integrated into cohesive in-groups, which
results in strong in-group loyalty and rigid between-group boundaries (Hofstede 2001;
Hui and Triandis 1985). We hypothesize that such groups are more likely to adopt sui-
cide terrorismbecause the culture inwhich they are embedded in values the groupmore
than the individual. This in turn lowers the costs of self-sacrificial attacks by facilitating
recruitment and reducing societal backlash.Case studies, survey data, and experimental
evidence are discussed to demonstrate the plausibility of these mechanisms.
To test this hypothesis systematically, we use an event history analysis framework to
analyze data on the timing of adoption of suicide terrorism by 414 organizations for the
period 1981 to 2006.Group-level data are retrieved from theTerroristOrganizations Pro-
files database (TOPS; 2010) and from a RAND data set on terrorist organizations (Jones
and Libicki 2008). Information on the timing of adoption is obtained by combining four
independently collected terrorist event data sets (Global Terrorism Database [GTD]
2010; Pape 2005, app. I; Pedahzur 2010; World Incidents Tracking System [WITS]
2010). Themeasure of collectivism is constructed out of six extensively validated survey
instruments that tap collectivism (Diener 1995; Hofstede 2001; House et al. 2004; Ingle-
hart 2010; Schwartz 1994; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 1998). The results are
consistent with what we expected. Collectivism correlates strongly with the adoption
of suicide terrorism, even when we control for many alternative explanations.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows: in the next section, we discuss
the three perspectives on the spread of suicide terror: organizational capacity,
efficacy, and ideology. In the Cultural Resonance and Transnational Diffusion sec-
tion, we introduce the theory of cultural resonance in greater detail and describe how
it relates to diffusion processes. The from Collectivism to Suicide Terrorism section
outlines the specific mechanisms that explain how collectivism lowers the costs of
self-sacrificial strategies and leads to the adoption of suicide terrorism. Qualitative
evidence and reviews of survey and experimental studies illustrate the mechanism at
work. In the fifth section, we describe the data and the methods used to test the for-
mulated hypothesis quantitatively. Findings are presented in the sixth section.
Finally, we conclude by discussing the consequences of the findings, identifying the
limitations of our argument, and suggesting further research directions.
The Diffusion of Suicide Terrorism
Following students of collective violence (Hill and Rotschild 1986), there has been a
growing recognition among terrorism scholars that the decision to adopt the tactic of
suicide terrorism is not taken in local isolation but is best understood as a diffusion
process, inspired by the tactic’s use by other terrorist organizations (e.g., Bloom
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2005; Pape 2005). Three frameworks have been proposed to explain the tactic’s dif-
fusion: organizational capacity, efficacy, and ideology.
Organizational capacity accounts focus mainly on the capacity of organizations to
adopt new tactics. Two central organizational variables have received a considerable
amount of attention: institutional flexibility and network ties. Scholars emphasizing
institutional flexibility argue that terrorist organizations that are older and more
established are more likely to stick with existing tactics and repertoires, whereas
organizations that are newer are likely to take chances with innovations and consider
tactics such as suicide terrorism for adoption (Horowitz 2010). Scholars who focus
on network ties point out that adopting organizations learn about suicide attacks
through their contacts with other organizations that have already adopted and
successfully used the tactic (Bloom 2005, 123).
While organizational flexibility and networks are important determinants of why
organizations adopt and how innovations spread in general, they do not tell us much
about which specific innovations spread. In other words, they cannot explain why
highly flexible organizations adopt practice A and not B. Nor do they explain what
is it about A (and not B) that makes its spread through a given network more likely
(Strang and Soule 1998). The efficacy and ideology accounts shed more light on this
question. Efficacy accounts contend that adoption is a matter of the tactic’s net util-
ity to satisfy an organization’s goal (Pape 2005). Proponents of this view argue that
suicide attacks are ‘‘the ultimate smart bombs’’ that are especially effective in battles
with hard-to-target-states and easy-to-coerce democracies. In this account, suicide
attacks can inflict massive damage to strong states that can afford to harden targets
(Berman and Laitin 2005; Hoffman 2008). Other scholars focusing on efficacy
argue that suicide bombing is particularly effective against democracies because
such states have to justify their policies to domestic audiences and are therefore
especially sensitive to the higher civilian casualties that suicide bombings tend to
inflict (Pape 2005).1
While the efficacy account stresses the utility of suicide bombing for organiza-
tions, the ideology account emphasizes the role of belief systems in motivating
support for these attacks among followers. This account has at least two versions:
one focusing on religion and the other stressing nationalist resentment. The former
conceptualizes religion as a legitimator of self-sacrifice, arguing that other-
worldly ideologies make the use of suicide attacks more likely because they prom-
ise supernatural rewards for individual sacrifice (Hoffman 2008; Rapoport 1984).
It is important to note that the religious ideology account comes in two flavors.
One emphasizes the supernatural rewards for self-sacrifice promised by religion
in general (ibid.) and Islam in particular (Kanazawa 2007), whereas the other
focuses on more refined ideological frames such as Salafi Islam (Moghadam
2008).
The other version of the ideology account downplays the role of religion and instead
points at the role of nationalism that gets activated, especially during an occupation by
foreign forces (Pape 2005). According to Pape, nationalist resentment of foreign
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occupation creates a high degree of commitment among potential recruits and the
broader community, which enables organizations to conduct attacks that involve mem-
ber sacrifice.2
A number of studies have challenged the efficacy and ideology accounts.
Researchers have pointed out that numerous groups facing strong states and democ-
racies such as ETA in Spain or the IRA in Northern Ireland, among many others, do
not deploy the tactic (Piazza 2008; Wade and Reiter 2007). While religious ideol-
ogy, particularly Islam, seems to play a role in the adoption of suicide bombings,
there is also substantial adoption of the tactic by nonreligious or secular groups.
Indeed, prior to the Iraq war, the Tamil Tigers—a group with a Marxist ideology and
with Catholic and Hindu members—was the most prolific user of suicide terrorism
(Pape 2005). Other non-Muslim groups who have used the tactic include the Sikhs.
There are also several secular (and Marxist) Palestinian, Syrian, Lebanese, Kurdish,
Turkish, and Armenian organizations that deployed suicide missions. Moreover, not
all Islamic organizations use suicide strategies.
The goal of this article is not to decisively refute either the efficacy or the ideology
account. Indeed, we believe and will demonstrate that there are elements of truth in
both. Instead, we wish to highlight the deeper cultural dimensions that are relevant
to the diffusion process. The adoption of a practice by an organization is not only
a function of the practice’s anticipated effect but also has to mesh with the values,
beliefs, and attitudes of the members of the wider society in which the organization
is embedded. In other words, the practice has to be culturally resonant because deeper
cultural forces constitute actors and determine the costs of strategies.
However, cultural resonance is a lot broader than explicit ideologies involving
nationalism3 or religion, which assume that all differences in actor constitution and
costs of strategies can be accounted for by religious doctrine or nationalist struggles for
territory. Cultural sociologists have demonstrated the existence of deeper cultural
boundaries that transcend religion and nations (Hofstede 2001).We therefore argue that
it would be fruitful to move beyond ideological accounts and focus on deeper underly-
ing cultural dimensions that shape how actors choose strategies to obtain group goals.
Cultural Resonance and Transnational Diffusion
In this article, we follow Hofstede (2001) in conceptualizing culture as the ‘‘collec-
tive programming of the mind’’ that manifests itself in different values, practices,
symbols, and rituals. The importance of culture to diffusion has been repeatedly
acknowledged since the classic theorists of the subject. Tarde argued that whether
a certain social practice gets adopted depends on its cultural resonance: ‘‘the appar-
ent agreement of these foreign ideas with those that are already established in
dogmatic minds’’ (Tarde [1903] 1962, 245; also see Rogers [1962] 2003).
While distinct in some respects, the argument about resonance bears some resem-
blance to its use in the literature on socialmovement framing. Cultural resonance in this
literature refers to the extent to which concrete movement storylines are credible and
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salient enough tomotivate potential participants tomobilize because they are tailored to
resonate with the broader culture of the participants (Benford and Snow 2000). We
approach it from a different angle by examining how a tactic, instead of a frame,
becomes credible and salient and how this in turn shapes its diffusion (Chabot 2010).
Although there is widespread acceptance of the argument that adopters in general
and military actors in particular are culturally embedded (Johnston 1998), the inter-
play of cultural resonance between military strategy on one hand and potential adop-
ters on the other, has not received much empirical traction. Students of transnational
diffusion with an interest in culture have mainly looked at the cultural similarity of
source and adopter or the cultural power of role models (Simmons, Dobbin, and
Garrett 2006) and neglected the role of cultural similarity between the innovation
itself and potential adopters.4
This blind spot is partly caused by the fact that cultural resonance is hard to opera-
tionalize in a way that allows for deductive diffusion research. To do that one has to (1)
demonstrate that a coherent culture exists across time and across actorswithin a society;
(2) turn this coherent culture into a tractable, measurable variable; (3) demonstrate that
this cultural variable resonates with an innovation; and (4) determine whether this vari-
able influences decision making.
The effort to identify underlying cultural orientations that are deeper than the
plethora of concrete beliefs, values, attitudes, and ideologies is a relatively new
development in international relations (Dafoe and Caughey 2011) but has a con-
siderable tradition in other fields such as cultural sociology. Geert Hofstede was
one of the first to demonstrate that it is possible to identify cultural dimensions that
can be used to compare societies along a common denominator (Hofstede 2001).
Hofstede identified five such dimensions along which cultures fall. The dimensions
were posited by Hofstede after an extensive factor analysis of a large set of questions
administered across many different countries. The instruments were adjusted over
time, and the questionnaire expanded to more countries.5
This article considers the collectivism–individualism dimension. We utilize this
measure because it has the most straightforward theoretical link to suicide terrorism.
In addition, it happens to be the most validated and widely used instrument in cultural
dimensions research. At least six extensively validated survey measures of collecti-
vism exist (Diener 1995; Hofstede 2001; House et al. 2004; Inglehart 2010; Schwartz
1994; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 1998). Although developers of each scale
emphasize different elements of collectivism, they all agree that collectivists value the
interests of groups (families, tribes, and nations) over the interests of individuals when
those interests conflict. This in turn legitimates practices that benefit the group, at the
expense of the individual (Schwartz 1994; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 1998).
From Collectivism to Suicide Terrorism
Valuing the group over the individual reduces the costs of suicide bombings in two
ways. First, it makes it easier to convince extremist group members to sacrifice
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themselves and second, it reduces societal backlash. The decision to make the ulti-
mate sacrifice for the group is made palatable because the group is elevated as the
primary actor and one feels both the tug of expectations and a sense of responsibility
for the group. There is consistent experimental evidence that collectivists endorse
various kinds of sacrifice for the group and do so behaviorally in various social
dilemma games. Agreement with statements such as ‘‘People in a group should be
willing to make sacrifices for the sake of the group’s well-being’’ was strongly
correlated with scoring high on collectivism (Wagner 1995, 162).
More specific to terrorism, Argo conducted a survey on a sample of 351 Palestinians
living in the Balata Refugee Camp and looked at whether Schwartz’s communal and
self-enhancement values (which parallel collectivism and individualism; Schwartz
1994) predict the type of resistance activity the respondent would endorse (Argo
2009). The anchors ranged frommaking almost no sacrifice—visiting an injured person
in a hospital, to making some sacrifice—joining a rally during a curfew, to making a
high sacrifice—taking up arms andmartyrdom. She found that persons with communal
values were far more likely to endorse high risk or high sacrifice resistance compared
with persons with self-enhancement values (also see Weinberg and Eubank 1994).
This is consistent with interviews and testimonies given by would-be martyrs in
collectivist cultures, who describe deliberate certain death for one’s people or nation
in highly positive terms. Consider the often-quoted will and testament by Muham-
mad Al-Ghoul, a Hamas suicide bomber who killed nineteen and injured fifty-two
other Israelis. In it, he wrote the following statement to explain his act:
How beautiful for the splinters of my bones to be the response that blows up the enemy,
not for the love of killing, but so we can live as other people live . . .We do not
sing the songs of death, but recite the hymns of life . . .We die so that future generations
may live. (Hafez 2006, 90)
This sort of sentiment is far from uncommon. The Tamil Tigers even swear an
oath where they commit to sacrifice their life for their land: ‘‘I hearby promise that
I am prepared to sacrifice my life and fight to create a free Socialist Tamil Eelam,
which is the sublime aspiration of our Revolutionary Organization’’ (Wijesekera
1996, 23).
In addition to facilitating recruitment, valuing the group over the individual
lowers costs by reducing societal backlash against self-sacrificial innovations. We
conducted a preliminary analysis by looking at the data collected by the Pew Global
Attitudes Project (PEW; 2010). From 2002 to 2010, Pew asked Muslim respondents
in twenty-five countries whether suicide attacks against civilians were justified. We
correlated the country collectivism scores with the percentage of the population that
supported suicide missions. Collectivist countries approved of suicide missions
significantly more than individualists.
This is critical because a key insight about terrorist organizations is that they
almost always require substantial support of a broader population beyond the group
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members (Bloom 2005). Groups whose leaders miscalculate the support for a tactic
decline rapidly. For example, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Arme-
nia (ASALA) and the Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG) were abandoned by supporters
after ASALA’s 1983 bombing of a Turkish airliner EIG’s bombing of the Luxor
temple (McCauley 2006). Therefore, decisions by terrorist organizations to adopt
costly tactics such as suicide bombings need to be viewed as legitimate by their sup-
porters or sympathizers; not only the membership and leadership of the organization.
This qualitative, survey, and experimental evidence provides strong plausibility
to the link between collectivism and suicide terrorism. We now turn to considering
whether this relationship is indeed present by modeling twenty-six years of suicide-
bombing data while controlling for alternative explanations.
Data and Methods
Dependent Variable
To systematically assess whether a correlation between collectivism and the adoption
of suicide bombing exists, we analyze the first adoption of suicide terrorism by 414
terrorist organizations. The overwhelming majority of all suicide attacks are planned
and conducted by organizations (Pape 2005; Sprinzak 2000).6 Following Horowitz
(2010), we have therefore chosen terrorist organizations as our unit of our analysis,
as opposed to countries (Wade and Reiter 2007) or attack events (Piazza 2008).
A country-level analysis would be too crude as it overlooks the presence of dif-
ferent ethnic groups in one country (Palestinians in Israel). An attack-level analysis
would not allow us to look at the adoption of strategies, as there is no adopter. We
also prefer conducting the analysis at the organizational level because it enables us
to deal with organizational composition effects. For instance, we know that collec-
tivist countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan have numerous young terrorist organi-
zations that according to the organizational resource theory are more likely to adopt
(Horowitz 2010).
We relied on two sources to identify terrorist organizations. First, we made use of
the RAND incident database (Jones and Libicki 2008). This database lists all non-
state organizations that conducted violent attacks between 1968 and 2001. For each
organization, it reports the location of the group’s home base, size, and ideology, as
well as founding and dissolution dates. Based on the Terrorism Organizational Pro-
files database (TOPS 2010), we independently confirmed the existence of each of
the organizations, removed doublers (aliases, covers, etc.) and added a couple orga-
nizations that were missing from the original RAND file. This resulted in a total of
600 organizations. From this list, we deleted all organizations that ended before
1981, since this was the date of the first modern suicide attack (Moghadam 2008;
Pape 2005). In addition, we removed all organizations that existed less than a year
and conducted fewer than one attack.7 Of the 414 remaining organizations, sixty-
eight conducted suicide attacks.
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The analysis starts in 1981 after the first suicide attack against the Iraqi embassy
in Beirut and ends in 2006, the last year for which detailed data on organizations are
available. We also conducted a robustness check with five additional years based on
the organizations culled from the Global Terrorism Database.8 We do this because a
substantial portion of suicide attacks happened in those five years, though unfortu-
nately a large portion of the new organizations have limited information for our
controls variables. To make sure that our analysis is not driven by organizations
from Iraq and Afghanistan, two collectivist countries with a large amount of suicide
attacks, we also estimate models excluding them.
Data on the exact timing of adoption are obtained from four different data
sources: Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism (Pape 2005); Terrorists, Insurgen-
cies, and Guerillas in Education and Research data set (Pedahzur 2010); World Wide
Incidents Tracking System (WITS 2010); and Global Terrorism Database (GTD
2010). Each of these sources identifies the exact date and the organization respon-
sible for the attack. Based on this information, we were able to link attacks to the
414 organizations. Since we are interested in the diffusion of suicide terrorism,
we only looked at the date of first adoption. After an organization adopts suicide
terrorism, it leaves the analysis because it is no longer ‘‘at risk’’ of adopting suicide
terrorism. However, results were also confirmed by conducting analysis with two
and three attack adoption thresholds.
An event counts as a suicide bombing if the act is meant to kill or maim others
through the use of an explosive device and where the (1) bomber volunteers and
(2) knowingly faces self-inflicted certain death in detonating the explosive device.
The data sets therefore exclude cases where the detonation was done without the
knowledge of the bomber or through coercion or deception.
Independent Variable
Instead of using a particular collectivism scale, we decided to construct a single
index out of multiple scales. We did this for three reasons. First, since each of these
efforts uses slightly different groups, we wanted to minimize the amount of missing
data and imputations in our analysis. Second, since the scales measure collectivism
and individualism in slightly different ways, but are otherwise correlated; it would
make the analysis far more robust. Third, because each scale suffers from somewhat
different shortcomings, using a composite measure would balance out the problems
associated with any single scale. We constructed an index out of six very well-
known and extensively validated dimension scores that measure collectivism at the
ethnic group level: the Hofstede Scores of Individualism–Collectivism (Hofstede
2001), the Trompenaars Scores of Individualism–Communitarianism (Trompenaars
and Hampden-Turner 1998), the GLOBE Scores of Societal Collectivism (House
et al. 2004), the Schwartz Scores of Embeddedness-Autonomy (Schwartz 1994), the
Triandis Scores of Collectivism (Diener 1995), and the World Values Scores of
Survival-Self-expression developed by Inglehart (1997). Questions for the scales
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differed widely, but the underlying theme was pitting the interest of the individual
against that of the collective and seeing which trade-off the participants were more
likely to make. Some items involved survey questions such as ‘‘In this society, lead-
ers [ought to] encourage group loyalty even if individual goals suffer?’’ while others
included the ranking of values such as having a ‘‘Sense of Belonging: (feeling that
others care about me)’’ or being ‘‘Independent (self-reliant, self-sufficient)’’. All
individual scales and their measurement are described in online appendix A.
Since the measures are scaled differently, we took the mean of standardized
scores to construct the index. The resulting collectivism/individualism index is reli-
able (a¼ .81). The scores ranged from2 to 2, with the anchor points denoting most
individualistic to most collectivistic groups, respectively.
Ideally, we would like to have also measured the level of collectivism among the
members of all 414 terrorist organizations in our study. However, because these data
do not exist, we were forced to use national level scores of collectivism to assign
scores to terrorist organizations of different ethnic groups. As a rule, we identified
the ethnic community of each group and assigned a score based on this, rather than
automatically taking the country in which they were active. So while Turkish groups
active in Turkey were assigned the score for Turks, Armenian groups active in
Turkey were assigned the score of Armenians, rather than Turks. Scores for multi-
national terrorist groups such as al-Qa’ida were coded based on the average score of
the predominant nationalities that made up the organization (e.g., al-Qa’ida received
the average score of Saudis, Egyptians, Jordanians, Iraqis, Syrians, Algerians, Mor-
occans, Palestinians, and Afghans).
In addition to pragmatic considerations, there are theoretical and methodological
reasons for not measuring collectivism at the organizational level. First, the mechan-
ism by which collectivism works is not centered on the terrorist organization mem-
bers exclusively. As explained previously, a substantial portion of society in which
the terrorist group is embedded has to support the martyrdom of its members. They
have to assign positive status to those who sacrifice, and they have to approve of
suicide operations, which are done on their behalf. Therefore, ethnic community-
level collectivism scores help capture this broader group. Members who join terrorist
organizations come out of this broader pool of sympathizers. For some terrorist
organizations, suicide bombers are volunteers prior to joining the organization and
have the support of their families and the local population.
Second, let us suppose that members from terrorist organizations are more collec-
tivists on average than members of their societies via both selection and influence. In
this sense, we are offering a conservative test biased in favor of individualism and
the null hypothesis. If there was variation in collectivism at the societal level but
no variation at the terrorist group level, then we should not observe our effect, after
putting so many controls. Instead, there is a good reason to believe that there is a link
between societal and group-level collectivism. While there is variation within soci-
eties, there is much greater variation between societies (House et al. 2004). It is
highly likely that if we actually measure the collectivism of the Irish Republican
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Army members and those of Hezbollah, the actual scores will be somewhat more
collectivist than that of Ireland (0.39) and Lebanese Shiites (0.19) generally, but
that the scores will still be close to their respective countries of origin—in the very
least they will preserve their ordinal ranking. So although we might be underestimat-
ing the level of collectivism, this bias is similar for all our cases.
This procedure provided information on sixty ethnic communities representing
335 terrorist organizations. However, this still left thirty-two ethnic communities
and 79 organizations to be imputed, since their scores were not listed in any data set.
Some work has demonstrated that it is possible to impute missing values on collec-
tivism scales by taking the geographic regional mean scores (Scherer 1997). Instead,
we relied on a more refined method, imputing missing values based on scores of the
geographically most proximate group with the same language and dominant religion
that had a score. Data on languages and religion were obtained from Fearon (2003)
and Fox (2004), respectively.
More information on how the imputation was done can be found in online Appen-
dix B. The list of terrorist organizations and their respective scores is available in
online Appendix C. To make sure that our imputation method was not driving our
results, we estimate all our models with and without imputations.
One possible concern is the stability over time of the collectivism measure and its
susceptibility to external shocks such as civil wars. We believe that this does not pose
any serious problems for the analysis because collectivism is relatively stable over
time as it captures a deep cultural dimension that cannot be tilted by single events
or political conditions (Hofstede 2001, 219). If it changes, it does so in unison leaving
intraethnic differences intact (Inglehart andWelzel 2005, 6). However, as a robustness
check, we included a model that controls for civil war as a possible confound with col-
lectivism. We identified ethnic groups in specific countries engaged in civil war based
on the dyadic version of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute
Oslo Armed Conflict Dataset (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2012).
Control Variables
To minimize the chance that the relationship between collectivism and the adoption
of suicide terrorism is spurious, we control for several additional variables, which
previous researchers have argued are likely to affect the adoption of suicide terror-
ism and that are also likely to correlate with collectivism.9 We first present variables
that tap the organizational capacity, religious ideology, and efficacy accounts. Next,
we introduce variables that are not directly related to diffusion but have been sug-
gested to explain suicide bombing in the terrorism literature in general.
Organizational Capacity. This account stresses the importance of organizational age
and network ties. Young groups are mainly formed in recent conflicts such as Iraq
and Afghanistan (Horowitz 2010). Since these groups also tend to be collectivist, we
control for the age of the terrorist organization. The age measure is obtained by
1268 Journal of Conflict Resolution 58(7)
subtracting the year of birth from the year of analysis. It is also well known that sim-
ilar groups are more likely to form ties with each other (Soule 2004). Therefore, it
could be that collectivist terrorist groups may simply be more likely to form ties with
one another, in which case their use of suicide terrorism has to do with them being
earlier adopters who cascaded the practice within their network, rather than being
collectivist. To test this possibility, we used a data set compiled by Michael Horo-
witz (2010) that has a variable that lists a given terrorist organization’s ties to other
organizations that use suicide terrorism. Since this variable is only available for
some organizations in our data set and does not vary over time, we estimate a sep-
arate model with this measure.
Efficacy. As previously explained, scholars of this account assert that suicide terror-
ism spreads because it is a particularly effective strategy against democracies (Pape
2005) and strong states (Berman and Laitin 2005). There is also some negative
correlation between democracy and collectivism, as democracies tend to be indivi-
dualist (Hofstede 2001). Therefore, if we do not take regime type into account, the
relationship between collectivism and the adoption of suicide terrorism may be spur-
ious. We thus add a variable that marks democracies, based on Polity scores. A coun-
try with a Polity score of 6 or higher is considered a democracy (Jaggers and Gurr
1995). Following Berman and Laitin (2005), we use logged gross domestic product
(GDP) as a proxy for strong states.10 It is also important to control for GDP since
collectivism is strongly correlated with economic development (Hofstede 2001), and
this correlation might actually affect the statistical association between collectivism
and the adoption of suicide terrorism. Data are obtained from Penn’s World Table
(Summers and Heston 1991).
Nationalist Ideology.We use two measures to control for various aspects of nationalist
ideology. In the main analysis, we add a dummy variable that marks all groups that
are motivated by nationalist sentiments (Jones and Libicki 2008; TOPS 2010).11
However, not all nationalist groups are necessarily occupied. We therefore sepa-
rately control for actual occupation as a robustness check. Data on occupation of
ethnic communities in specific countries were obtained from Piazza (2008) and
Edelstein (2004).12
Religious Ideology. The religious ideology account suggested that religious groups and
Islamic groups in particular are more likely to adopt suicide bombing. Both Hofstede
(2001) and Inglehart (1997) have pointed out that religious cultures also tend to be
more collectivist. We therefore included dummy variables for groups that explicitly
organized around any religious ideology as well as Islamist ideology in particular
(Jones and Libicki 2008; TOPS 2010).
Organizational Size. It is also plausible that groups with large resources are faster
adopters than groups with fewer resources. Smaller groups may not afford to mobi-
lize individuals who are willing to conduct destructive attacks and sacrifice
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themselves (Asal and Rehthemeyer 2008). Both the RAND and the TOPs data sets
provide information on approximate group size—a reasonable proxy for group
resources. For each organization, it is reported whether it has 0 to 10, 10 to 100,
100 to 1,000, or more than 1,000 members. We include dummies that mark organi-
zations of different sizes.
Organizational Density. Other scholars emphasize how suicide terrorism emerges in
the context of intense competition between terrorist groups over their constituents
(Bloom 2005). In order to win the hearts and minds of their local populations,
terrorist organizations conduct suicide attacks to signal commitment to their cause.
We therefore control for intergroup competition. Following Piazza (2008), we oper-
ationalize this variable as a simple count of the terrorist groups that are active in a
country and share the same constituent population.
Prior Adoptions in the Region. It has been demonstrated that cultural traits are con-
centrated in space (Scherer 1997). The adoption of suicide terrorism is also
likely to be geographically clustered because prior use of the tactic by proximate
actors may inspire their neighbors to adopt (Bloom 2005). Therefore, it is pos-
sible that statistical relationships between the adoption of suicide terrorism and
collectivism are biased by spatial autocorrelation (Ward and Gleditsch 2008).
We deal with this problem by modeling former counts of geographically prox-
imate adoptions. We calculated minimum distances between terrorist organiza-
tions. Geographical locations of minority groups were obtained from the
Georeferencing of Ethnic Groups data set (Weidmann, Rød, and Cederman
2010). For nonminority groups, we assumed that they were active throughout the
entire country in which they were based and used geographical information of
these countries. The information was retrieved from the C-Shapes data set.
We experimented with different types of spatial neighborhoods. The analysis
suggested that the effect of the parameter became stronger up to 500 kilometers
after which it experienced a distinct falloff. Therefore, we decided to model the
number of prior adoptions within a 500-kilometers radius.13
Repression. Extensive repression by the state is also likely to induce strong group
identities and violence. We measured repression as intentional one-sided attacks
by governments targeting citizens. Data are retrieved from Eck and Hultman
(2007). Since this variable is only available from 1989 onward, we include it in
a separate model.
Method of Analysis
We use an event history model to analyze the data described previously. This anal-
ysis focuses on the duration between the events in counties, which enables us to
exploit all available information on the exact dates of violent events. For each dura-
tion, event history models estimate the transition rate from one state to another; in
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our case, the event is the adoption of suicide terrorism. This focus on durations
enables us to investigate how time-varying and time constant characteristics of ter-
rorist groups affect the transition rate—the adoption of suicide terrorism as a tactic
(Strang and Tuma 1993).
Event history models have also proved to be very successful in simultaneously
explaining where incidents happen and how they diffuse from one location to
another, since they offer tools to deal with time dependence—overtime fluctuations
in violence that are not captured by the included covariates (Strang and Tuma 1993).
For example, international developments such as the 9/11 attacks and insurgencies
in Iraq and Afghanistan are likely to have an impact on the adoption of suicide
terrorism. It is almost impossible to parameterize all processes that might potentially
affect the estimates in our model. This raises a major analytical problem. Apparent
diffusion effects might not be caused by interactor imitation but instead follow out of
simultaneous adaptations to environmental changes.
Figure 1 shows that the adoption of suicide terrorism leveled off initially before it
started to increase rapidly. This suggests that the adoption rate is indeed affected by
overtime changes in the environment. In an event history framework, this problem can
be dealt with using partial likelihood techniques developed by Cox (Cox and Oaks
1984).14 Once assumptions are met, partial likelihood techniques estimate coefficients
that are constant for the entire period.15 In this way, overtime fluctuations in violence
are accounted for making cross-sectional and diffusion effects more robust.
The analysis starts in 1981 and ends in 2006. In total, 414 durations are analyzed, one
for each organization. Not all organizations existed for the entire period. An organiza-
tion entered the analysis at its date of birth and left the analysis for one of the three rea-
sons. First, it adopted suicide terrorism and was hence no longer at risk of adopting.
Second, it dissolved before it adopted suicide terrorism. Third, the group had not
adopted by the time the analysis periodwas concluded.Of all the terrorist organizations,
68 adopted suicide terrorism before 2006, and 347 were right censored; that is, they
ended because they dissolved or because the analysis period was over. In four cases,
problems emerged with groups that adopted in their year of birth or in 1981. Event his-
tory analysis cannot handle durations of zero. We resolved this problem by adding a
small number (.000001) to the time of adoption (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez 2008).
Another major methodological concern in the present analysis involves unobserved
heterogeneity. Several of the terrorist organizations in this study are from the same eth-
nic community. In addition to collectivism, groups share a lot of characteristics that are
likely to mitigate or accelerate the adoption of suicide terrorism. Organizations are
therefore not fully independent of each other. This violates one of the basic assump-
tions of regression analysis and is likely to introduce a downward bias in standard
errors. We resolved this problem by estimating standard errors without assuming
that organizations of the same ethnic community are independent. This makes our
standard errors robust to violations of the independence assumption. In addition,
we deploy a frailty framework using penalized likelihood estimation (Rondeau and
Gonzalez 2005) to estimate a multilevel model in which terrorist organizations are
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nested in ethnic communities, the level at which collectivism is measured. To make
sure ourmodelswere not compromised by amisspecification of the level of analysis,
we also ran models where ethnic groups were the unit of analysis, without organiza-
tional controls. Results were entirely consistent with the ones presented later.
Results
Table 1 depicts a first cut at our data. It shows the adoption of suicide terrorism bro-
ken down by collectivism. Of all organizations that score high on the collectivism
scale, operationalized as having a median score or higher, more than a quarter adopt
suicide bombing as a strategy. On the other hand, around 6 percent of all terrorist
organizations that score low on the terrorism scale deploy suicide attacks. Therefore,
this table clearly indicates that collectivist groups are more likely to adopt suicide
terrorism. Next, we examine whether this relationship also holds once we control for
possible confounding factors.
Table 2 presents the results of the partial likelihood regression of the adoption of
suicide terrorism by 414 terrorist groups, while controlling for other variables.16 The
coefficients represent hazard ratios—the hazard of a case divided by the hazard of a
case that scores one point lower on a relevant covariate. Hence, a hazard ratio of 1.1
can be interpreted as a one-point increase on a given covariate increases the hazard
by 10 percent, while a hazard ratio of .9 can be interpreted as a 10 percent decrease.
The model confirms our hypothesis; collectivist groups are more likely to adopt sui-
cide terrorism, controlling for alternative explanations. A one-point increase on the
collectivism scale, which runs from 2 to 2, increases the adoption rate by almost
130 percent. This effect holds if we control for nationalist, religious (model 1), or
Islamist (model 2) ideologies. It suggests that collectivism accelerates the adoption
of terrorism independent of other ideological belief systems.
When we consider the control variables, we see that consistent with Horowitz’s
work, there exists a negative correlation between age and adoption. However, this
relationship is not significant. We find inconsistent effects of democracy and GDP
on the adoption rate. This is at odds with versions of the efficacy argument that claim
suicide bombing is used against hard-to-target-states and easy-to-coerce democracies
(Berman and Laitin 2005; Pape 2005). The analysis shows that the negative effect of
democracy found in models 1 and 2 is not robust to different specifications. The
Table 1. Adoption of Suicide Bombings Based on the Organization’s Collectivism Level,
1981–2006.
Collectivism Percentage
High (above or equal to the median) 25.23 (222)
Low (below the median) 6.25 (192)
Total 16.43 (414)
Note: The number of observations is indicated in parentheses.
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conclusion that democracy shows no clear-cut effect is consistent with analysis by oth-
ers (Wade and Reiter 2007). National income (GDP) is positively related to adoption
in most models but disappears after repression is added to the equation. This could
suggest that the effect of state strength might be due to repressive capacity.
In-line religious ideology accounts the model indicates that religious groups are
much faster adopters of suicide terrorism than nonreligious groups. The adoption
rate of religious groups is almost five times higher, while the adoption rate of Isla-
mist groups is six times higher than non-Islamist groups. Groups engaged in nation-
alist struggle, however, are not more likely to adopt suicide bombing. To some
extent, this questions the role of nationalist ideology, but we later consider an alter-
native operationalization, to assess this argument more fully.
Attacks in the region increase the hazard ratio considerably in the first model.
This suggests that spatial contagion might be at work. Model 3 sheds some doubt
on this notion as the spatial contagion measure becomes insignificant after network
ties are included in the analysis. This provides some evidence for the fact that spatial
contagion is to some extent driven by the local clustering of networks.
The size of a terrorist organization does appear to play a role. Groups of ten or
smaller are least likely to adopt for the simple reason that they cannot afford to shed
any members. The gradual increase in the coefficient of the three dummies suggests
that there is a linear relation between size and adoption: the bigger the group, the
faster it adopts suicide terrorism. This suggests that groups with greater resources
are better able to recruit human bombs and dovetails with the observation made
by Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) that large terrorist organizations can be more lethal
and destructive. Confirming the competition argument (Bloom 2005), we find in our
first three models that suicide bombings are more likely to be adopted in regions that
experience intense competition between terrorist groups over the same constituents.
Each extra competitor increases the adoption rate by 5 percent. The effect of com-
petition however disappears in the fourth model, indicating that repression explains
away the correlation between organizational density and suicide terror.
In models 3 and 4, we include controls for which we have fewer observations.17
Model 3 addresses the role of ties to suicide-bombing organizations. Each extra tie to
an organization that uses suicide terrorism increases one’s own likelihood of adoption
by 27 percent.Model 4 includes the state repressionmeasure. As hypothesized, we find
a positive relationship between repression and the adoption of suicide terrorism. An
attack by the state increases the likelihood of adoption by58percent.However, it is pos-
sible that this correlation is affected by a reverse causality bias since it could be that sui-
cide attacks by terrorist organizations is what leads states to adopt evermore repressive
measures. The inclusion of the repression (regardless of the causal direction) and net-
work variables does not wash away the effects of collectivism. In fact, the addition of
the network measure actually increases the collectivism coefficient.
Table 3 further shows that our results are not driven by our imputationmethod.Mod-
els 5 through 8 demonstrate that if we reestimate the samemodels without the imputed
cases, we still find a positive and significant relationship between collectivism and the
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adoption of suicide terrorism. In fact, the correlation actually becomes a bit stronger in
most models.
Table 4 presents some robustness checks and alternative specifications. Model 9
deploys a frailty framework to estimate a multilevel model of organizations nested in
ethnic communities. As we can see collectivism still has a considerable effect on
adoption. The next model excluded observations from Iraq and Afghanistan to make
sure that these two countries alone are not accounting for the pattern we found. As
we can see this is not the case.
Model 11 provides support for an alternative operationalization of the role of nation-
alist ideology, as formal occupation does appear to affect the spread of suicide terrorism.
Organizations engaged in civil war are alsomore likely to conduct these types of attacks.
However, the collectivismeffect remains robustwhencivilwaror occupation is included,
as models 11 and 12 both show. The final model adds data for the 2007 – 2011 period
because a disproportionate number of suicide attacks occurred during those five years.
We extended the time series for thirty-six existing organizations, added thirty-five new
organizations, and coded ten new adoptions of suicide bombing. Due to data limitations,
we could not collect information on all the control variables, used for the main analysis.
Nevertheless, we see that collectivism is significantly correlatedwith the adoption of sui-
cide bombing when we extend the time series for an additional five years.
Because it is somewhat counterintuitive to interpret and compare the magnitudes of
hazard ratios, we also computed predicted probabilities (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez
2008) for all significant predictors in model 1. We estimated the increased probability
of adoption in 2006 when we moved relevant covariates from the minimum to the
maximum value while keeping other variables constant. Results are presented in Fig-
ure 2. The figure shows that at the end of our analysis period, the most collectivist
organizations were almost 50 percent more likely to adopt suicide terror than the most
individualist organization. This is a large effect compared to the other measures; only
the number of prior attacks in the region has a stronger effect on adoption. However, as
we have seen earlier, this effect is not stable under different model specifications.
Discussion and Conclusion
The results indicate that terrorist organizations embedded in collectivist cultures are
more likely to adopt suicide terrorism. This finding in conjunction with existing quali-
tative, experimental, and survey data suggests that cultures that emphasize the group
over the individual lower the costs of suicide terrorism, making adoption of this tactic
more likely.While the existing accounts of how the tactic spreads assume that the costs
and actors involved in the decision-making process are either uniform or solely shaped
by religion or nationalism, our finding indicates that one should also consider to the
deeper cultural dimensions that transcend ideology.
The idea that terrorist organizations embedded in collectivist cultures are better
able to recruit volunteers as suicide bombers and suffer less of a societal backlash
when a suicidal strategy is deployed has a broader implication. It points to how
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culture not only sets the kinds of goals that actors follow but also constrains the kinds
of tactics they may adopt to achieve those goals by systematically altering the costs
of those tactics. This in turn has implications for understanding how culture may
seep into the decision-making process of tactical adoption. In explaining a tactic’s
popularity in terms of its costs and benefits, one must attend to how the costs may
be influenced by the broader culture of the tactic’s adopter. As a kind of ‘‘human-
guided bomb,’’ the tactic of suicide bombing has a number of mobility, navigation,
and control advantages, which are not available in conventional bombs whose deto-
nation mechanism is remote controlled, timer based, or activation triggered. But sui-
cide bombing is also highly costly. At the most basic level, the using organization is
certain to have its membership roll decrease by at least one. Moreover, having a rep-
utation for using suicide bombers may dissuade potential recruits. Sympathizers may
withhold support, and members may object to having their colleagues sacrificed in
this manner; some may become demoralized and quit or even splinter from the orga-
nization. Collectivism helps lower such costs in that being embedded in societies
where individual-for-group sacrifice is more broadly and deeply accepted makes all
the relevant parties—decision makers, organizational members, and sympathizers—
approving of the tactic’s legitimacy. Thus, for a terrorist organization embedded in a
collectivist society, considering a menu of tactical choices, suicide bombing will
present itself as cost-efficient relative to other tactical choices, while the opposite
is the case for terrorist organizations embedded in individualist societies.
Although arguments about culture-shaping efficacy have been made in the field
of international relations, they have not been tested systematically in a transnational
diffusion framework. This article demonstrates how studies of transnational diffu-
sion in general and conflict in particular can incorporate cultural dimensions in a
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Figure 2. Change in the probability (increase ¼ black, decrease ¼ gray) of adopting suicide
bombing by terrorist organizations in 2006 as covariates are moved from their minimum to
their maximum value, while keeping other variables constant (based on model 1).
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deductive research strategy by building on ideas developed in cultural sociology.
Moreover, the study makes a contribution for students of transnational diffusion
of innovations, demonstrating how culture plays a role not only in the similarity
between source and adopter but also between the adopter and the innovation itself.
If toward the end of our main analysis (ending in 2006), a policy maker was to ask
us to predict where suicide terrorism would spread to in the next five years or which
groups are the most at risk of adoption—our answer would have been—groups that
are collectivist, religious/Islamist, and geographically close to where the tactic has
been most frequently used, which is the Middle East. Those would be Muslim
groups in sub-Saharan Africa, given the area’s collectivism score and proximity
to the Middle East. Indeed from our supplemental analysis of the 2007 to 2011 GTD
data, we have seen that a substantial number of new users are just such groups—
Al-Shabaab, the Mujahideen Youth Movement in Somalia, and Boko Haram in
Nigeria. The fact that our model with collectivism was able to ‘‘predict’’ the next
adopters gives us confidence in its robustness and validity.
There are, however, a number of limitations to our study that could hopefully be
addressed in future research. Much more systematic efforts can be undertaken to
gather more collectivism data, particularly at the organizational level. In addition,
data on more groups and cultures would help minimize imputation and measurement
error. Future research could also consider whether a relationship exists between col-
lectivism at different levels (e.g., family, clan, religion, and state); perhaps certain
kinds of collectivists are more likely to adopt suicide bombings than are others.
In addition, it would be valuable to further investigate the link between collecti-
vism and other high-cost tactics, particularly other sacrificial tactics. Such tactics are
very costly but also very potent and include social movement repertoires of self-
immolations (such as the one that, more recently, launched the Arab Spring), mili-
tary tactics of human wave attacks, and perhaps even uses of chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear weapons by actors who know that the consequence will also
involve the destruction of part of their own group or population. But beyond sacri-
ficial tactics generally and suicide bombings specifically, cultural dimensions
research offers fertile soil to students of war and peace.
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Notes
1. Ashworth et al. (2008) have attacked this line of work on methodological and empirical
grounds.
2. It is important to stress that Pape combines both efficacy and ideology arguments in his
analysis.
3. While the two concepts are related, nationalism is not merely ‘‘extreme collectivism.’’
Not all collectivists are motivated by nationalism, and it is possible for individualist
cultures to produce persons with a strong devotion and consciousness/identity of being
a member of a particular nation. Our data confirm this as we find only a weak correlation
between collectivism and the presence of nationalist movements.
4. But see Chabot (2010) for a notable exception.
5. For reviews of the collectivism–individualism literature, see Early and Gibson (1998) and
Schimmack, Oishi, and Diener (2005).
6. In our database, less than 1 percent of all attacks for which the perpetrator could be coded
were conducted by isolated individuals.
7. This was done because we are interested in relatively durable organizations. Including
groups that existed for less than a year picks up anomalous entities such as the Internet
Black Tigers (a group that engaged in a cyberterrorist attack on behalf of the LTTE),
eclectic entities such as the Vitalunismo (a ‘‘group’’ composed of one person whose
ideology is connected to UFO conspiracies) or groups that may have been temporary
shills of intelligence agencies to conduct operations with plausible deniability such as
Counterrevolutionary Solidarity (a right-wing Guatemalan group that conducted a single
bloodless attack against a Sandinista ambassador).
8. Only organizations and events that were confirmed and met all the criteria on the GTD
database were used. TOPS (2010) does not contain data for organizations founded after
2006. We did the best we could to gather data for the covariates from other sources. To
estimate the founding and ending year of new organizations, we used date of first and last
attack. Information on the ideology of the organizations was retrieved from the Violent
Extremism Knowledge Base (2013) and the Mapping Militants Project (2013). Unfortu-
nately, no consistent data on the size of organizations could be obtained.
9. We also included interactions between collectivism and all the other independent vari-
ables. None of these variables were statistically significant. Results were identical to the
ones presented later. In an additional analysis, we controlled for attacks per year, since it
is possible that collectivist organizations are more active users of terrorist strategies in
general. Once again, results were consistent with the ones presented later.
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10. Divided by 1,000 to reduce the number of digits.
11. We also modeled an interaction term between occupation and democracy. This did not
have an effect nor did it alter our results. We also experimented with different democracy
thresholds and a continuous measure. This did not make any difference.
12. We included eight occupations: Afghanistan by NATO, Iraq by United States, and Other
Coalition Troops; Lebanon by Israel, United States, France, and Syria; West Bank and
Gaza Strip by Israel; Chechnya by Russia; Kashmir by India; Kurdish regions by Turkey;
and Northern Ireland by the United Kingdom. For more information and a list of specific
terrorist organizations that were fighting each occupation, please see online Appendix D.
In an additional analysis, we added Tamils in Sri Lanka (not listed by Piazza and Edel-
stein). Results were in line with the ones presented in the following. The present opera-
tionalization excludes organizations connected to an occupied area but who were fighting
from abroad rather than from within the occupied area. Including such groups made no
difference to the results.
13. We also modeled all prior adoptions conditioned on inversed geographical distance.
Results were in line with the ones presented in the following.
14. Parametric distributions such as theWeibull, Gompertz, normal, log-normal, log-logistic, or
gamma distribution did not fit the adoption rate of suicide terrorism (Cox and Oakes 1984).
15. Inspection of the Schoenfeld residuals indeed indicated that the proportional hazard
assumption of the models was not violated (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez 2008).
16. We reestimated every model without influential observations. Results were all consistent
with the ones presented in the following. Inspection of multicollinearity statistics also did
not suggest any problems.
17. We take model 1 as the baseline for models 3 and 4. However, it is important to highlight
that results are almost identical when we use model 2 (hence, the control for Islamism
instead of religion).
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